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1. Introduction
One of the pertinent questions regarding globalization is: how does globalization a¤ect wages?
In this paper we address a particular aspect of that question: how does o¤shoring1 a¤ect rm
level average wage? O¤shoring rms are found to pay higher average wages than purely domestic
rms (Bernard et al 2007). Guided by existing theory, we provide empirical analyses of di¤erent
possible channels through which o¤shoring can cause rm average wage di¤erentials. O¤shoring
may push up rm level average wage in di¤erent ways: rst, if rms o¤shore low-skilled low-wage
tasks that automatically increases the average wage of the remaining jobs. We call this the skill
composition e¤ect. Second, o¤shoring can be viewed as new technology that rms adopt to
reduce costs and increase revenue and prots. In a labor market environment featuring search,
screening and bargaining frictions, o¤shoring rms and their workers bargain over rm specic
rents o¤shoring induced rents can increase wages of all existing workers and thus increase
average wages in these o¤shoring rms. We call this the rent sharing e¤ect.
We explain how much each e¤ect contributes towards higher average wages in o¤shoring
rms. Papers in the o¤shoring literature look at one channel at a time but not both. It is
possible that both e¤ects exist in the data and looking at one channel by ignoring the other may
confound the results. In the past few years o¤shoring has become a major trading activity. The
impact of o¤shoring on parent country labor outcomes stirs public controversy. We carefully
investigate Danish worker-rm data to disentangle the e¤ects of the two suggested mechanisms
on rm average wages. It is important to distinguish the two e¤ects from one another as policy
makers would draw diametrically opposite conclusions from either e¤ect. While we document
the presence of the skill composition e¤ect, underlining that certain jobs in Danish rms do move
out of the country, we also document that Danish rms benet from increased protability and
share this increased protability with workers, i.e. through rent sharing. Thus the presence of
the one channel, skill composition, highlights what developed nations worry about, but there is
also the rent sharing channel that tells a positive story about o¤shoring, and for some rms we
nd that the latter channel completely accounts for the di¤erential wage gains from o¤shoring.
Identifying the causal relationship between o¤shoring and higher rm level average wage is
di¢ cult. First, rms endogenously select into o¤shoring: rms that o¤shore are, on average,
larger, more productive, and tend to pay higher wages than smaller rms that are less productive
1O¤shoring here refers to a fragmentation of the production process due to relocation of jobs from the home
country to the foreign country.
2and less likely to o¤shore. Second, higher skilled workers may select into o¤shoring rms because
these rms are bigger and pay higher wages. Thus, separating the causal story from the selection
story is important, i.e. to say whether the higher average wage paid in o¤shoring rms stems
from o¤shoring per se or from higher productivity that simultaneously leads to more o¤shoring,
higher output, and wages.
We use Danish worker-rm data that tracks the universe of Danish workers across the uni-
verse of Danish rms. This amazingly rich dataset provides detailed information on individual
wage histories from which we are able to construct measures of skill composition e¤ect and rent
sharing e¤ect at the rm level. Following Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999) (henceforth
AKM), and Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2012),2 we decompose the rm level average wage
in each year into an average person component, reecting the skill composition of the work-
force, and a rm component which we interpret as the measure of time-varying rm specic rent
sharing.
We use events in China to identify the causal e¤ect of a change in the incentive to o¤shoring
on rm level average wages. We argue that two possibly related events occurred: First, Chinas
accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) in December 2001 created a surge in for-
eign rms operating in China as well as new Chinese exporters. Upon accession, China made
enormous changes to meet its WTO obligations including among other things restructuring
industries, publishing previously internal laws and regulations, establishing formal procedures
to adjudicate disputes, leveling the playing eld for foreign rms, and giving all rms right to
trade. These changes were phased in gradually over a transition period, usually within three
years after accession, directly inuencing rms incentive to o¤shore to China. Second, there
was a boom in Chinese world exports around 2003 driven by the structural changes undertaken
by the Chinese government around that time. This led Chinese exports to more than double
from 400 billion US dollars in 2002 to 900 billion in 2005. The surge in Chinese exports acted
as an additional indirect incentive for rms in Denmark to source from China in order to main-
tain competitiveness with rms who would have cost advantage by sourcing cheaper Chinese
resources. Thus, Chinas joining the WTO can be viewed as a shock to the trading environment
in China and the observed Chinese export boom as a cost/technology shock, to which we expect
Danish rms to respond. In fact, we do see a jump in the Danish share of imports from China
in 2003, indicating that Danish rms were a¤ected by the shock.
2For an extended and more detailed version, see Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2011).
3The rst step of our analyses is to ensure that within industries, rms o¤shoring to China
were a¤ected di¤erently compared to rms who were not o¤shoring to China in the 2002-2005
period.3 Next we check that the di¤erential change was greater during the shock period, 2002
-2005, compared to an earlier period, 1999 -2001. This procedure ensures that we are identifying
trend di¤erentials between two completely di¤erent periods and thus not trend di¤erentials, a
priori, between two types of rms the treatment and the control group.
We nd that, between 2002-2005 average wage increased around 1.5 percent more in rms
o¤shoring to China compared to the control group. The skill composition e¤ect accounted for a
quarter of the di¤erential increase while the rest was explained by rent sharing. Our results are
robust to controlling for underlying trend di¤erences i.e. comparing the wage gain in 2002-2005
with an earlier period, 1999-2001. Splitting rms up by their o¤shoring status in China we nd
heterogeneous results: The di¤erential wage increase between the two periods was the largest
for the new o¤shorers i.e. rms o¤shoring to China in 20024 but not in 19995 and was explained
by rent sharing only. The continuing o¤shorers i.e. rms that o¤shored to China in both 1999
and 2002 experienced di¤erential wage increase between the two periods mostly through the skill
composition e¤ect. Firms o¤shoring to China in 1999 but not in 2002 showed no di¤erential
wage change in this period. These heterogeneous patterns are not discernable when we use
common proxies for measures of skill composition and rent sharing available in the typical rm
level datasets.6 The di¤erence in results when using measures of composition and rent sharing
e¤ects from the rm level data to those constructed from the worker-rm data shows that we
should draw results from the typical rm level data (commonly used in the o¤shoring literature)
with more caution.
In addition to papers that use linked worker-rm and rm level data our work is related
to a number of papers using industry level data. Feenstra and Hanson (1996, 1997) show that
o¤shoring a¤ects rm level average wage by a¤ecting the skill composition of the domestic work-
force. Becker, Ekholm & Muendler (2009) nd evidence that o¤shoring is associated with a shift
towards more non-routine and interactive tasks as well as a shift towards more educated work-
ers (skill composition e¤ect) in German MNEs. In these models the labor market is assumed
to be perfectly competitive and cannot account for possible rent sharing e¤ects. Allowing for
3 In particular the control group used in the results presented in this paper includes rms o¤shoring to other
low middle-income countries but not China in 2002 and non-o¤shoring rms.
4 i.e. the beginning of the dened shock period.
5 i.e. the beginning of the dened pre-shock period.
6Such as ratio of educated to uneducated workers and sales per employee.
4imperfectly competitive labor market, Bagger, Christensen & Mortensen (2010) nd evidence of
rent sharing in the Danish labor market, but their paper does not address the o¤shoring issue.
Sethupathys (2008) bargaining model assumes homogeneous labor and shows that o¤shoring in-
creases productivity and protability of o¤shoring rms compared to non-o¤shoring rms. The
di¤erential increases lead to higher domestic wages at o¤shoring rms through a positive rent
sharing mechanism. Using US MNE rm level data he provides evidence that higher average
wages at o¤shoring rms is consistent with a rent sharing mechanism. However, his outcome is
also consistent with the skill composition e¤ect and his results do indicate that the skill com-
position e¤ect is present. Kramarz (2008) also uses a bargaining model to show that o¤shoring
can a¤ect wages directly by altering rmsthreat point and thus changing the overall quasi-rent
shared between rms and workers. His model shows that level of union strength matters, with
rms facing stronger unions o¤shore more, decreasing the size of the quasi-rent to discipline
workers. Using French worker-rm data he shows that rms facing stronger unions increased
o¤shoring more with an associated decline in employment and rents. His results indicate that
o¤shoring might have a dampening e¤ect on wages through the rent sharing mechanism. His
paper also assumes homogeneous labor and is silent about the skill composition channel.
Our data has rich information on worker types and jobs performed and would be able to
address rent sharing and the composition e¤ect simultaneously. Hummels et. al. (2010) analyze
the relationship between o¤shoring and workerswages and employment opportunities also using
Danish employer-employee data. They nd that exogenous import shocks increase wages of
skilled labors and decrease wages of unskilled workers, whereas shocks to exporting increases
wages of both types of workers. Our results complement their ndings on wages and shocks to
o¤shoring; we show that o¤shoring a¤ects average wages through both skill composition and rent
sharing e¤ects, and how much each of the two channels contribute relative to each other. A paper
close to ours in terms of econometric methodology is Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (FKV 2012),7
and, in addition, we use their method for constructing measures of rm level skill composition
and rent sharing e¤ect from the worker level data.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we discuss the theoretical motivation behind our
work. Section 3 describes the dataset. Section 4 discusses the econometric methodology and
identication strategy. In section 5.1 we use rm level measures similar to what has been used
in the o¤shoring literature in the absence of worker-rm data. In section 5.2 we make full use
7For an extended and more detailed version, see Frias, Kaplan, and Verhoogen (2011).
5of the worker-rm data to decompose rm level average wage into a skill component and a rent
sharing component and analyze how a shock in the incentive to o¤shoring a¤ects average wages
through these channels. Section 6 does robustness checks and section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical Motivation
In this section we briey sketch the theoretical motivation behind our work. Suppose there are
heterogeneous rms who di¤er in terms of productivity; heterogeneous workers who vary at the
skill level; imperfections in the labor market with presence of search costs, screening and wage
bargaining leading to rent sharing between rms and workers. As a result, wage of each worker
type depends on the share of rm-specic rents. We do not assume any particular form of rent
sharing i.e. the form can be prot sharing, revenue sharing or both.8 Both high skilled and
low skilled tasks are required for production of a good. Either type of task can be o¤shored
which involves a marginal cost and a common xed cost. Heterogeneous rms and xed cost
of o¤shoring imply that only the most productive rms can endogenously select into o¤shoring.
The less productive rms must source from the home market.
A new o¤shoring opportunity can be viewed as new technology involving a xed cost and a
lower marginal cost compared to sourcing from the home market. Following a fall in the cost
of o¤shoring, more rms will be able to take advantage of this technology but some rms will
still not be productive enough to overcome the xed cost. The new o¤shoring opportunity will
imply displacement of jobs in rms that o¤shore. Thus, a fall in the cost of o¤shoring changes
the skill composition in the o¤shoring rms compared to the non-o¤shoring rms. If relatively
low skilled, low wage jobs are sent abroad then onshore skill composition increases. Because
skilled labor earns higher wage, o¤shoring increases the average onshore wage through a pure
composition e¤ect. This e¤ect was rst suggested in Feenstra and Hanson (1996). We call this
the skill composition e¤ect on rm level average wage.9
We expect that rms become more cost e¢ cient by taking advantage of new o¤shoring
opportunities. This e¤ect leads to a reallocation of production and prots towards the o¤shoring
rms. If rent sharing exists between rms and workers then the wage of the average worker
increases in o¤shoring rms and falls in the disadvantaged, non-o¤shoring rms. We call the
8Some commonly used, empirical proxies of rm specic rents are: sales per employee (revenue) or prots per
employee (prot sharing).
9This e¤ect works both ways for the skill composition: If high-skill jobs are o¤shored the skill composition
falls onshore causing the average onshore wage to fall. Recent empirical evidence suggests that o¤shorability does
not solely depend on the skill level of the task but rather on the degree of routineness and inter-activeness of the
task. So o¤shoring can indeed decrease the onshore skill composition.
6second e¤ect the rent sharing e¤ect. Thus both the skill composition and the rent sharing e¤ects
could be responsible for higher domestic wages at o¤shoring rms compared to non-o¤shoring
rms. Our empirical approach in sections 4.2 and 5.2 investigates how much each channel
contributes towards higher average wage in o¤shoring rms. While the skill composition e¤ect
provides evidence for the type of jobs o¤shored within rms, the rent sharing e¤ect is evidence
for the rmsprotability and their survival in the market. It is important to distinguish between
the two e¤ects, since these two e¤ects will have di¤erent policy implications .
For a simple illustration of the two e¤ects at work, let us consider the very simple case of
two types of labor: low skilled (L) and high skilled (H) labor. Onshore rm level average wage
w can be expressed as:
w =
X
f=L;H
sfwf ; f = fL;Hg
where sf is onshore skill type share and wf is onshore skill type wage. We can decompose the
discrete change in rm level average wage that we observe in the data as
 w =
X
f=L;H
sfwf +
X
f=L;H
wfsf (1)
The rst term on the right hand side is the change in rm level average wage due to a change
in skill composition and the second term is the change in average wage brought about through
a change in the wage of each type of worker, e.g. due to a rent sharing mechanism.
Many settings can lead to simultaneous increase of revenues and prots with wages. We
suggest a causal explanation by using a shock in the incentive to o¤shore and splitting up the
e¤ect on rm average wages into two channels: 1) skill composition change that a¤ects rm
average wage and 2) changes in prots that are shared through rent bargaining leading to all
wages increasing at the rm and thus also rm average wages.
Other possible explanations include that more productive rms induce higher learning and
thus higher wages. O¤shoring rms may transfer knowledge across the border and increase
worker productivity locally, making their workers otherwise identical to workers in lower pro-
ductivity rms more valuable and thus pay them higher wages (Malchow-Møller, Markusen
& Schjerning, 2007). We believe that this possible explanation is not a likely concern in our
setting: It is not obvious that sourcing from China generates these types of spill-over gains for
workers, and certainly not in the rst years following the broad opening up of China.
One might also think of compensating di¤erentials: To take a job or stay in a job in a sector
7or a rm where workers due to o¤shoring face the risk of being separated from their jobs or
reallocated to less attractive job positions, the rm may have to o¤er workers a compensating
di¤erential. We consider this reasoning amounting essentially to a type of rent sharing: The
management team at the rm still needs stable onshore labor, and workers use their bargaining
power when they see protability at the rm increases.
What we track in our estimates are changes to the level of rm xed e¤ects on rm average
wages during a period. We do not track the composition of the level of worker-rm time-
varying xed e¤ects. Thus, we stick to the concept of rent sharing when talking about estimated
changes to worker-rm xed e¤ects. Note that the conclusions one draws form the two channels
are diametrically opposite. The skill composition channel suggests what kind of jobs Danish
rms o¤shore to China. This channel thus underlines an imminent concern for policy makers 
how to compensate the workforce separated from their jobs as a result of o¤shoring. The rent
sharing e¤ect however underlines that there are positive sides to o¤shoring because it increases
protability of the rm and the rm shares part of the prots with its workers, thus contributing
to improved welfare.
3. Data
Our main data source for this paper is the very rich, Danish, annual, matched, worker-rm panel
from Statistics Denmark. The data currently spans from 1996-2008 and includes data from three
linked databases, FIDA (1996-2008), IDA (1980-2008), and rm level External Trade Statistics
(1990-2008). For our baseline results we use data on manufacturing rms only spanning from
1999-2005. All data are restricted and provided by Statistics Denmark.
FIDA is the Firm Integrated Database for Labor Market Research. It contains the (almost)
full population of rms registered in Denmark. It provides accurate rm level data, including
general, external accounting statistics, number of employees, and a record of individuals em-
ployed in the rms. Via a person key, FIDA can be linked to the Integrated Database for Labor
Market Research (IDA), containing extensive information on socio-economic characteristics of
the population of Danish residents. IDA variables include among others hourly wage, status
on connection to labor market, age, sex, education, experience, tenure, and occupation. Edu-
cation can broadly be classied in three categories: high skilled, requiring tertiary education;
medium skilled, requiring vocational education dened as consumption of secondary education;
and low skilled, dened as persons with short cycle education (typically 1-2 years) or high school
education.
8Via a rm key, we also link the worker-rm panel to rm level External Trade Statistics
(1990-2008). This adds country-product level bilateral external trade data to our dataset.10
Each trade ow contains information on the value of trade in DKK (f.o.b prices for exports and
c.i.f prices for imports), the weight, and the volume. This dataset allows us to investigate the
e¤ect of a change in the incentive to o¤shore on rm level average wage.
Our main results are based on core manufacturing rms (NACE 15-36).11 We consider rms
with 10 or more employees. We also carry out robustness checks where we use our entire sample of
rms. Our measure of o¤shoring is a broad one that includes rmsimports of both intermediate
and consumption goods. For example a positive productivity or cost shock in China might a¤ect
o¤shoring decision of Danish rms, hence their imports and wages. In line with our theoretical
motivation, rms that are able to import consumption and intermediate goods are able to expand
their available potential technologies with associated increase in protability that get translated
into higher rm level average wage through rent sharing. Imports by manufacturing rms will
also a¤ect the kind of tasks (low skill and high skill) performed in the domestic rm and thus
a¤ect rm level skill composition. In our empirical analysis, imports as a share of sales proxy for
o¤shoring at the rm level, and we proxy o¤shoring rms as those sourcing from abroad. Skill
composition and rent sharing measures are constructed from the data using a worker level wage
regression equation and explained in detail in the estimation strategy section. Table 1 provides
comparison of rm level characteristics for the year 2005. Consistent with rm level ndings in
other countries, Danish rms that o¤shore are bigger in terms of employment and sales; have
higher skill ratio (in terms of educated and non-educated workers), prots per employee and
hourly wage, both on average and for each type of employee. For example o¤shoring rms have
on average 85% higher employment and 36% higher sales than non-o¤shoring rms.12 This
result holds for other years in the sample as well. However, these results do not provide a causal
mechanism from o¤shoring to higher wages, which we discuss in the following section.
4. Estimation
We are interested in assessing how a change in the incentive to o¤shore a¤ects rm level average
wage through the skill composition e¤ect and the rent sharing e¤ect. In the rst step we show
10Product classication is the European Combined Nomenclature (CN), 8-digits. We use at the maximum
6-digit level which is consistent with HS-6 classication.
11Manufacturing rms best suit the underlying theoretical motivation and has often been used in empirical
papers in the o¤shoring literature.
12The column to the far right of Table 1 presents results from simple mean di¤erence regressions in Table 1
(i.e. statistical di¤erences between means for o¤horing rms and means for non-o¤shoring rms).
9how rm level average wage can be split into a rent sharing component and a skill component.
Our estimation strategy of decomposing rm level average wage essentially relies on the FKV
technique. In the second step we relate the change in average wage and the two components
arising from an exogenous shock in the incentive to o¤shore to China. We begin by discussing
our second step: the identication strategy. Then we move on to our estimation method.
4.1. Identication Strategy. In this section we argue why we choose 2002-2005 as our
shock period for our di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations. 1999-2001 will act as our pre-shock
period. In the following discussion we thus refer to the years 1999, 2001, 2002, and 2005 as they
mark the beginning and the end of the two periods considered. We base our segregation of rms
into control and treatment groups based on the rmsstatus in the rst year of the two periods
considered (i.e. 1999 or 2002).
To test how a change in o¤shoring opportunity a¤ects rm level average wage through
composition and rent sharing e¤ects, we use events in China as exogenous shocks in the incentive
to o¤shore to China. The events represent business condition, cost and productivity shocks in
China and are likely to a¤ect many local decisions of Danish rms. Our analysis does not
compare the clean case of increasing wage di¤erentials between rms o¤shoring and rms not
o¤shoring. Instead, the estimations are carried out as increasing wage di¤erentials between rms
taking advantage of a new favorable o¤shoring destination and rms that do not.
China joined the WTO in December 2001, which was a very important event for the Chinese
economy. An export boom occurred in China soon after China joined the WTO,13 driven by
the di¤erent policies undertaken by the Chinese government. These two events mark Chinas
coming to the forefront as an important member in the global economy. Chinas accession to the
WTO implied comprehensive liberalization, some of which would come into e¤ect immediately
whereas others were to be phased in over a period of typically less than three years. Some of
the key components of Chinas accession to the WTO involved:
1. Gradual tari¤ reduction of agricultural and non-agricultural commodities. However the
scope of tari¤ reduction was not massive, only 40% of about 10,000 products at HS8 level
were eligible for tari¤ reductions over a period of ve years with tari¤s for the majority of
the products being reduced by 2005.
13See Figure 1.
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2. Services commitments involving substantial market opening of a broad range of service
sectors, including banking, insurance, telecommunications, and professional services.
3. Phasing out of NTM such as licenses, quota, tendering state trading, export subsidy and
removal of all WTO inconsistent non-tari¤measures (NTMs) by 2005 as well as elimination
of Chinas trade related investment measures (TRIMS).
4. Allowing all rms (whether domestic or foreign) the right to directly import from and
export within three years from accession also providing the right to engage in distribution
of all products in China within three years of accession (except certain extended restrictions
on chemical fertilizers, crude oil, and rened petroleum).
5. The provisions of systemic reforms involved broad reforms in the areas of transparency,
notice and comment, uniform application of laws, and judicial review to help address
barriers to foreign companies doing business in China.
6. China agreed to elimination of state-trading import monopolies for agricultural and indus-
trial products and to the requirement that state-owned enterprises must make purchases
and sales based solely on commercial considerations.
Accession to the WTO signaled credibility to the world that China was open for more foreign
investment and trade. Given the enormous changes that were to take place to facilitate both
foreign investment in China and imports from China to the rest of the world, Chinas accession
to the WTO appears to be a shock of considerable magnitude to the incentive to o¤shore to
China since it created a more conducive trading and business environment. This is the direct
impact of Chinas joining the WTO on the o¤shoring incentive of Danish rms.
The WTO membership for China helped in spearheading further economic reforms, opened
up the Chinese market for more international trade and higher levels of foreign investment,
and opened up the world economy for Chinese exports. This, along with the various structural
changes and liberalization policies adopted by the Chinese government around that time, led to
a surge in Chinas exports soon after it joined WTO. Figure 1 shows that the surge in exports
from China to the rest of the world was largest in 2003 and 2004. Chinas emergence as a major
exporter has an indirect impact on rmsincentive to o¤shore from China from a third party
competition angle. If a rm does not source inputs from China, but its rival rms (either in the
same or a di¤erent country) do and reduce their costs and price, then the rm has to follow suit
11
or risk losing market share. Thus, as the rest of the world begins sourcing cheap inputs from
China, we should expect rms in Denmark to behave similarly. One observation of interest is
that though China joined the WTO in December 2001, we see exports increased the most from
China to the rest of the world in 2003 and 2004. Two explanations are, rst, that China had a
transition phase to complete the liberalization, so the initial changes were not large enough to
drive a large increase in exports immediately. Second, a small recession in the world economy
in the post 9/11 crisis dampened the export growth from China in 2002. What is important in
our context is that both these shocks, possibly related, and global in nature, are exogenous to a
small open economy like Denmark and would not be a¤ected by local rm behavior but would
inuence them.
From Figure 2 and Figure 3 we see that Danish rms, both manufacturing and non-manufacturing,
reacted strongly to these episodes in China. Figure 2 shows the growth charts of Danish manu-
facturing imports from top non-EU15 partners and Eastern Europe. Imports from China (CN)
by Danish manufacturing rms take o¤ in 2003 while this is not true from Eastern European
countries. These import responses are consistent with the surge in Chinese world exports.
Figure 3 shows the number of rms (manufacturing and non-manufacturing) importing from
China as share of total rms, from 1999 to 2005. This pattern also holds for the number of rms
importing from China, for example in 2002 both the total number of rms and manufacturing
rms sourcing from China increased sharply, by 37% and 30%, respectively, by far the biggest
increase during 1999-2005. From 2001 to 2005 the number of rms importing from China
increased over two times from about 3000 to 7000, the corresponding numbers for manufacturing
shows an increase by two times approximately from a little less than 500 rms in 2001 to about
a 1000 in 2005 (tables not provided) . The above discussion indicates that Danish rms, both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing, did respond to the shock of Chinas emergence as an
emerging leading exporter following its accession to the WTO.
Because the number of rms sourcing from China has increased dramatically over a few
years, we want to know about the nature of the rms that were sourcing from China before
we see a surge in share of imports from China in 2003. We divide rms into the following four
types: i) rms o¤shoring to China both in 2002 and 1999, ii) rms o¤shoring to China in 2002
but not in 1999, iii) rms o¤shoring to China in 1999 but not in 2002, and iv) rms o¤shoring to
low middle-income countries but not China in 2002 and 1999 and non-o¤shoring rms, for the
year 2002. In Table 2, a comparison of rm characteristics based on the types listed above, show
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that the rms who were sourcing from China in 2002 but not in 1999 (new o¤shoring rms) are
relatively smaller in terms of sales and employment compared to rms who were sourcing from
China in both 1999 and 2002 (existing o¤shoring rms), as well as rms who were o¤shoring
to China only in 1999 but not in 2002 (former o¤shoring rms). The omitted group consists of
rms o¤shoring to low middle-income countries but not China and non o¤shoring rms in 2002
and 1999.
In Table 3a and Table 3b we present the growth rates (annualized) of imports in Danish
manufacturing in 1999-2001 and 2002-2005, respectively. From these tables we see that the
annualized growth rate in overall imports was lower in the 2002-2005 period than in the 1999-2001
period, when considering imports pooled across countries and also when we separate imports
by high and low/middle income countries, except for China. The growth rate of imports from
China was higher in 2002-2005 compared to 1999-2001. Moreover, the growth rate of total
imports from China was 13 times the growth rate of overall imports in 2002-2005. The 1999-
2001 annualized growth rate of overall imports from China was only about twice the growth rate
of total imports. These tables also show the growing importance of Chinese imports in Danish
manufacturing in 2002-2005 compared to 1999-2001. We also decompose the aggregate growth
rate in each column into contributions from consumption goods and intermediate goods based
on the BACI classication of HS6 products into stages of production . When comparing growth
rates for consumption goods and intermediate goods for China with those of all countries (second
column versus third), we again see that the growth rates of each type of good imported from
China compared to other sources was higher in the 2002-2005 period, and of the total import
growth rate 61-75 percent came from rising intermediate imports, the rest from consumption
goods.
Unlike other papers in this literature, we do not restrict o¤shoring to be only intermedi-
ate goods imports for manufacturing rms; consumption goods imports are also considered as
o¤shoring in this paper. In Table 4 and Table 5 we list consumption and intermediate com-
modities, respectively, based on the value imported in 2005 and 2001. Table 4a and Table 5a
list top 20 commodities (based on their value of imports in 2005 in DKK) that are classied as
consumption goods and intermediate goods respectively. For example Table 4a shows that boys
jackets and trousers (HS6 products 620333 and 620343) are among the top products directly
imported by Danish manufacturing rms from China in 2005. We consider this as o¤shoring:
if the rms are making the garment designs in Denmark and producing the garments in China
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and importing them back to Denmark, where they are labeled and packed then it constitutes as
o¤shoring in our context because fragmentation of the production process occurs. Relocating
production to China implies lower production costs, and that is likely to induce skill composition
and rent sharing e¤ects. Moreover many of the food products that are listed as consumption
goods could very well be intermediate inputs in food manufacturing rms. Thus the fact that
surge in imports from China to some extent is driven by consumption goods works well for the
o¤shoring framework we have in mind. Table 6a indicates that most of the increase in Chinese
imports was at the intensive margin; intensive margin being dened as commodities imported
from China in 2002 as well as 1999 at the HS6 product category level.
Finally, Table 6b provides the decomposition by two broad rm categories those importing
from China in 2002 and those not importing from China in 2002 but importing from China
sometime between 2003 and 2005. We see that the former category contributes more towards
the total change in imports from China between 2002-2005 period, mostly through the intensive
margin; for the latter group, the entire change is by denition at the extensive margin.
4.2. Firm Level Average Wage Decomposition. We use the basic statistical framework
of AKM for decomposing information on individual workerswage into individual heterogeneity
and rm heterogeneity. The linear worker-rm regression model of AKM with time-varying rm
e¤ect is
wit = i + xit +  j(i;t) + "it (2)
where i, j, and t are individuals, rms and time respectively. wit is log wage; i is the time-
invariant individual xed e¤ect. xit is a vector of observable time-varying individual characteris-
tics. So these components comprise the skill e¤ect on individual wages.  j(i;t) is the time-varying
rm e¤ect. The function j(i; t) indicates the rm in which worker i is employed in period t.
We allow the rm e¤ect  j(i;t) to vary over time to take into account changes in rms wage
policies in response to trade shocks. "it is the residual, with the identifying assumption that
E["itji; t; x] = 0 and is orthogonal to all other e¤ects in the model.
Following FKV, we now decompose the rm average wage into an average rent sharing
component and an average skill component. The way we do is by subtracting from the variables
their mean across individuals at each point in time. Note from equation 2 that
i = wit   xit    j(i;t)   "it
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Recalling that E("it) = 0, we then dene the mean deviation of i at time t as
~i  i   i = i   E(wit   xit    j(i;t))  "it
The sample analogue of the expression above uses the estimated parameters ^i, ^, and  ^j(i;t)
of equation 2: b~i  wit   xit^    ^j(i;t)   wit   (xit^)   ^j(i;t)
Dene ~sit  sit   st = ~i + xit   xit as the mean deviated value of sit and introduce, as
above, the sample analogue:
~^sit  s^it   s^t = b~i + xit^   xit^
Insert the expression for b~i, reduce, and rearrange. We get the individual mean deviated wage
as:
wit   wt = ~^sit +

 ^j(i;t)    ^t

(3)
Taking the average across individuals within each rm j, we arrive at the split of rm average
wage into an average skill component and a rent sharing component, expressed in values as mean
deviated by individual means at time0@ 1
Njt
NjtX
i=1
wit
1A  wt| {z }
rm avg. wage (deviated)
=
0@ 1
Njt
NjtX
i=1
~^sit
1A
| {z }
avg. skill comp. (deviated)
+

 ^j(t)    ^t

| {z }
rent sharing (devaited)
(4)
Denoting the mean deviated variables at the rm level in equation 4 as yjt = yjt   yt, we now
have the variables wjt, sjt, and  jt. Analogous to equation 2, we can write
 wjt = sjt +  jt
where  indicates the time di¤erence of the variables wjt, sjt, and  jt from year t  1 to year t
(i.e. our di¤erence-in-di¤erences observations of dependent variables in our analysis).
Using these three variables as our dependent variables in di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimations
allows us to break down the coe¢ cient on the treatment dummy in the  wjt-regressions into
15
the coe¢ cients of the treatment dummies in the sjt- and  jt-regressions, respectively. Thus,
we track changes in rm average wages and contribute the reason to either skill-compositional
changes, rent-sharing e¤ects from increased protability, or both. Once again we underline
that results from this split leads to completely di¤erent policy conclusions: Skill compositional
changes underline that Danish rms do o¤shore low-skill jobs, but rent sharing e¤ects increase
wage for workers at the Danish rms which adds a positive welfare story to o¤shoring that has
direct positive impact on workers at the rm.
4.3. Estimation Equations:. We test our theoretical motivation that we have boiled down
to equation (1) in section 2, using two types of di¤erence-in-di¤erences (DiD) estimations and
a set of outcome variables. Based on the identication discussion earlier we dene our shock
period to be 2002-2005 and a pre-shock period14 to be 1999-2001. Our DiD equations are:
ykj = +  + d_2002 +Dj + "kj (5)
ykj = + 1d_1999_2002 + 2d_0_2002 + 3d_1999_0 +Dj + "kj (6)
ykj is the change in an outcome variable of interest for rm k in industry j (Dj captures
industry xed e¤ects). We consider the di¤erence over 2002-2005. In equation 5 d_2002 is a
dummy variable for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002. Thus d_2002 is our treatment rms;
control rms (omitted group) are rms who o¤shore to other low-middle income countries but
not China as well as rms that do not source inputs from abroad in 2002.1516
Equation 6 carries out di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates by rm types, depending on when
they were o¤shoring to China prior to 2003. As mentioned in the data section, the types that
we consider are: d_1999_2002, rms sourcing from China in both 1999 and 2002; d_0_2002,
rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999; d_1999_0, rms o¤shoring to China in 1999
but not in 2002. The omitted group is non-o¤shoring rms and rms not o¤shoring to China
but other low middle income countries. The main outcome variables of interest are 1) rm level
average wage, 2) skill composition, and 3) rent sharing. All results in the next section use Danish
manufacturing rms only (NACE 15-36).
14To test for trend di¤erences in a DiDiD.
15Results are similar using other treatment and control group. See Section 6 on robustness.
16We do not include rms importing from high income countries in our control group because the products
they import might not be comparable to those obtained from low/middle income countries in terms of price and
quality.
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We carry out all estimations following two parallel tracks: One track utilizing only typical
rm level information, and a second track making full use of the worker-rm matched data.
Comparing these two approaches demonstrates the fruitfulness of having worker-rm matched
data even though the scope is rm level analyses.
5. Results
5.1. Estimating Results from Firm Level Data. We begin by looking at rm level
variables before decomposing rm level average wages into skill composition and rent sharing
components from worker level regression. Typically, rm level datasets give skill ratio (skilled
vs. unskilled), sales per employee (rent sharing). Apart from gauging the impact of the shock on
various rm level outcomes, this exercise allows us to compare our results obtained from using
more nuanced measures of skill composition and rent sharing e¤ects by taking full advantage
of linked worker-rm information with those that are commonly used in the literature and
readily available in typical rm level datasets. The skill ratio that we use in this section is the
traditional measure based on education of the employee; skilled labor being those having more
than high school education and unskilled are those with high school or less than high school
level of education.
Table 7 shows the estimation of equation 5. From columns 1 and 3 we see that average wage
and skill ratio di¤erentials changes are 1.5% and 3.6%, respectively, higher for rms o¤shoring
to China in 2002 compared to the control group. Columns 2 and 5 indicate that employment
and sales di¤erentials are 6.2% and 5.1%, respectively, less for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002
compared to those who were not. The sales gure that we have represents export and domestic
sales of the rm from Denmark, so one possible reason for negative di¤erential increase in
the value of sales17 could be due to reduction of prices of commodities through reducing cost
by o¤shoring to China.18 Interestingly, there is no statistically signicant change in sales per
employee. If sales per employee is taken as a proxy for revenue based rent sharing then this
result indicates that skill composition is the only channel through which wages are a¤ected,
due to o¤shoring, between treatment and control rms in this period. Column 6 indicates that
imports as share of sales (o¤shoring) are 1% higher for treatment rms than for control rms
during the 2002-2005 time period, showing that Danish rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 are
17 I.e. treatment rm sales increase less from 2002 to 2005 than control rm sales do. Recall these are di¤erence
in di¤erences in sales.
18 It can also be o¤shore exports to third-party country.
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better able to take advantage of the liberalized business environment change in China and hence
fall in cost of o¤shoring to China.19Moreover, though Chinese trade has become important for
Denmark over the years, it constitutes about 5% of manufacturing imports.
Since the number of rms importing from China has increased over the years we carry out the
di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimation over 2002-2005 by breaking down types of rms depending
on when they were o¤shoring to China and see if any di¤erential results emerge among the types
of rms. Table 8 shows our ndings; the types we are interested here are rms o¤shoring to
China both in 2002 and 1999; rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999; rms o¤shoring
to China in 1999 but not in 2002; rms o¤shoring to low middle-income countries but not China
and non-importing rms (the omitted group).
Results in Table 8 show that rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999 experience
the highest di¤erential wage increases. Firms present in China in both 1999 and 2002 also show
increase in average domestic wages in this period but less than rms new to sourcing inputs
from China. Similarly, the change in employment is stronger for the rms newly o¤shoring
to China. Just as in Table 7, column 4 in Table 8 indicates no di¤erential labor productivity
(sales-per-employee) changes between the di¤erent types of rms in the 2002-2005 period.
Because Chinas joining the WTO was anticipated, we may worry that our treatment rms
are responding to the shock by changing their technology before 2002 to take better advantage
of cheaper Chinese resources. The ndings in Table 8 alleviate that worry. Though the ac-
cession was anticipated, there was quite a lot of uncertainty in Denmark about the suitability
of o¤shoring to China, apart from the various restrictions that were not to be dismantled till
after China joined WTO. Likely, this uncertainty prevented rms from increasing the level of
o¤shoring to China in anticipation of the future changes. Hence, although rms could fore-
see new o¤shoring opportunities due to long drawn WTO negotiations, it is unlikely that they
could take advantage of it before the liberalizations came into e¤ect. The results in column (6)
provides support to this idea; since the change in o¤shoring was higher for the two types of
rms importing from China in 2002,20 compared to the omitted group, we can conclude that
19The control group includes non-o¤shoring rms, inating the e¤ect if they do not choose to o¤shore during
the period. On the other hand, some of them could choose to o¤shore in 2003, 2004 or 2005, which could imply
arbitrarily large jumps in import shares (from zero to something) compared to the treatment rms that mostly
o¤shored to somewhere else than China at the beginning of 2002. Thus, presence of non-o¤shoring rms in the
control group could also understate the e¤ect. However, excluding these (few) non-importing manufacturers does
not change results much. Thus, for consistency we decide to stick to the same sample as for the other estimations
in Table XXXXXXXXXXX.
20 i.e. rms continuing o¤shoring from China, and rm new to o¤shoring from China.
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both types of o¤shoring rms responded to the shocks by increasing the share of imports from
China in the 2002-2005 period. The results in this table also indicate that the wage increases
we witness in Table 7 are most pronounced for the rms that decide to o¤shore to China around
2002. This nding coupled with results in descriptive statistics in Table 2 lends support to the
idea that Chinas accession to the WTO and the soon after surge in Chinese exports was more
important for the relatively smaller and less productive rms who could not take advantage of
Chinese imports prior to 2002 because of restrictive business environment in China; they began
o¤shoring to China once China joined the WTO and also saw a surge in exports soon after.
To ensure that the results observed in Table 7 and Table 8 are indeed driven by the shock
and not by di¤erential trend between the more productive treatment rms compared to the less
productive control rms, we need to check that the observed change in the outcome variable
was greater during the period 2002-2005 than in other periods.
We consider the pre-shock period 1999-2001. We estimate an equation similar to equation
6, taking the di¤erence in the change in the outcome variable of interest over 2002-2005 from
1999-2001 and regressing it on the three types of rm dummies. This essentially leads to a
triple-di¤erences strategy which purges any di¤erential trend for the rms. Results in Table 9
indicate that the di¤erential change in average wage is the largest for rms new to o¤shoring
from China in 2002 (d_0_2002). Average wage changed 3.6% more for these rms in the 2002-
2005 period than in the 1999-2001 period compared to control rms. Skill ratio changes though
positive are not signicant. Di¤erential change in sales per employee (column 4) between the
two periods is not signicant either for the new o¤shoring rms (d_0_2002) compared to the
omitted group. To sum up, though we nd that events in China caused di¤erential outcomes
in 2002-2005 between treatment and control rms over and above their basic underlying trend
di¤erences, using crude proxies for skill composition and rent sharing cannot explain what is
driving the observed di¤erential wage increase. Since skill includes much more than education
and rent sharing might not just mean sharing revenue, we now use information on workerswage
histories in our worker-rm data to construct more rigorous measures of skill composition and
rent sharing e¤ects.
5.2. Estimating the E¤ects from a Worker-Firm Regression. We rst estimate a
standard AKM-type model (equation 2) with time-varying rm e¤ects. The inclusion of time
varying rm e¤ects allows us to address changes in rm wage policies following trade shocks.
As time varying returns to individuals we include linear and quadratic terms for experience and
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age, and education (high skill: tertiary education; medium skill: vocational education; omitted
group: high school or less). Table 10 shows the estimates from our worker-rm regression. As
expected, more years of experience are associated with higher wages and there are diminishing
returns to experience. Similar results are also true for age. Unsurprisingly, high skilled workers
and medium skilled workers earn more than low or unskilled workers.
We then estimate the e¤ect of the shock on rm level average wage through the two ef-
fects constructed from the worker-rm regression using estimation equations 5 and 6. Table 11
presents results for di¤erence-in-di¤erences estimates for equation 5 over the 2002-2005 period.
In this section we now nd that average wages (deviated from annual mean) increased 1.2%
more for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 than control rms and both skill composition and
rent sharing are responsible for this increase both signicant at the 10% level. Skill compo-
sition increased 0.3% more for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 and explains about 25% of
the wage increase. Rent sharing increased 0.9% more for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 and
accounts for as much as 75% of the wage increase.
To ensure that the di¤erence we observe is driven by the shock, we carry out a triple dif-
ferences estimation similar to Table 9, by regressing the changes in our outcome variables of
interest (rm level average wage, skill composition and rent sharing deviated from their respec-
tive annual means) between 2002-2005 and 1999-2001 periods, on the di¤erent rm dummies.
The results for wages corroborate what we found earlier. Table 12 shows signicant (at 10%-
level) di¤erential wage gains for rms new to o¤shoring from China (d_0_2002). Now we can
say what is driving that wage di¤erential: rent sharing only. Interestingly, for rms o¤shoring
to China in both 1999 and 2002, the di¤erential gain in wages between the two periods is ex-
plained more by skill composition e¤ect rent sharing though positive is insignicant. For rms
o¤shoring to China only before 2002, all the outcome variables have negative sign, though none
are signicant. The fact that wages increased di¤erentially for the rms o¤shoring to China
in 2002 is in line with the underlying theory. Moreover, we arrive at the apparent puzzle: the
mechanisms behind the di¤erential wage increase between the two periods (2002-2005 and 1999-
2001) is di¤erent for relatively the smaller rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 but not in 1999 and
relatively larger rms o¤shoring to China in both 2002 and 1999. A glance at our data in Table
2 shows that the rms o¤shoring to China in 2002 and not in 1999 (d_0_2002) are smaller than
rms o¤shoring to China in both 1999 and 2002 (d_1999_2002). Thus, the former rms are
likely to have more homogeneous workers in terms of skill over the years and that could explain
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why their di¤erential change in skill composition between the two periods is small. Bigger rms
continuing to o¤shore to China are likely to have more diverse workforce hence their wage in-
crease is accounted for by both mechanisms. Again, comparing results in Table 9 and Table 12
suggest that using measures of skill composition and rent sharing using worker-rm matched
data allows us to take into account aspects of average wage determination that is not captured
by traditional measures of skill based on education and rent sharing based on revenue sharing.
5.3. Robustness Check. In this section we carry out di¤erent robustness tests to strengthen
our main results.
As a rst check we re-estimate our main equation using alternate rm dummies, to see
whether there was any di¤erential wage e¤ect for rms who began o¤shoring from China between
2003-2005, though their decision to do so was possibly endogenous. The rm types that we
consider are d_2002: rms o¤shoring to China in 2002; d_2003_2005: rms o¤shoring to
China after 2002, i.e. sometime in 2003-2005 period but not doing so in 2002; the omitted group
are rms not o¤shoring to China between 2002-2005 but o¤shoring to other low-middle income
countries and non-o¤shoring rms. Table 13 provides qualitatively similar results for the rms
o¤shoring to China in 2002 (d_2002firms) as found in Table 11. Both skill composition and
rent sharing e¤ects explain the higher change in wages and the latter channel explains more
of the increase for these rms. We also see that there are wage gains for rms o¤shoring to
China after 2002 (d_2003_2005 rms), mostly via the skill composition e¤ect, so rms that
began o¤shoring to China later have also gained. Table 14 presents a triple di¤erences estimate
by comparing the di¤erential change in the change in our outcome variables of interest over
1999-2001 period and 2002-2005 period. The results indicate that there are di¤erential gains in
wages between the two periods for both types of rms, and both channels matter.
We carry out our main estimation using manufacturing rms only. We re-run the main
estimations with all rms: manufacturing, services and retail/wholesale rms. The reason is
twofold. First, our data reveals that rms switch status over the years; so a manufacturing rm
might become a service or retail rm by o¤shoring its manufacturing operations. These rms
would drop from our manufacturing sample and thus might lead to under-estimation of the
e¤ects of o¤shoring on our variables of interest. Second, the impact of the shock was also very
pronounced for non-manufacturing rms as discussed in section 4.1. The results, displayed in
Table 15, are consistent with our main results presented in Table 10, though coe¢ cient estimates
are now larger. We see there was wage gain for rms o¤shoring to China in 2002, and relatively
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more of that increase is explained through rent sharing. Triple di¤erences estimation results in
Table 16 again show that most of the di¤erential increase is for the rms importing from China
in 2002 but not 1999, but now only skill composition e¤ects signicantly explain that increase,
and just roughly half of the di¤erential gain. The other half cannot signicantly be attributed
rent sharing. There is also di¤erential increase in wages observed for the rms importing from
China in 2002 and in 1999, and that increase is still explained only through the skill composition
e¤ect and completely dominate the total e¤ect on average wages.
What if the e¤ects we see are not from the rmsnew activities in China but instead from
o¤shoring to other, similar countries? That is a very relevant concern. We have run our pro-
cedures on other similar countries and former Eastern European countries among which many
are now part of the EU and not low-income countries anymore. We nd no results. Recall that
we have a well-sustained argument for an unanticipated shock for Danish rms, particularly for
small rms even though Chinas accession was anticipated. In fact, running our regressions on
a subsample of small rms 10-50 employees show even stronger average e¤ects. We see no
other shocks of arguably same scale. The case of the Czech Republic demonstrates nicely why
e¤ects must come from Chinas accession to the WTO acting as an unanticipated shock: very
few of the treatment rms also o¤shore to the Czech Republic. The reason is that many of the
rms are relatively new to o¤shoring and have few common source countries apart from China
(see Table 18).
In 2005, growth in imports from Eastern European countries starts to pick up lowering the
ratio of China imports relative to Eastern Europe import to 1.7.21 To exclude this possible source
of gains from o¤shoring to countries other than China from our results on the treated groups we
run the estimations with the shock period dened as 2002 to 2004 instead of 2002 to 2005. Our
qualitative results hold and estimates are perhaps contrary to ones a priori beliefs generally
higher (see Table 19). Combined with the robustness check from other countries just discussed
above in this section, we are condent that our results stem from the opening up of China as
a sourcing destination and the dominating shock for our treatment groups. We do still refer to
the results based on 2002-2005 as our main results because growth in imports from China still
dominates any other sourcing destination in 2005 and thus dene by when imports from China
in an absolute amount truly takes o¤.
21The ratio ranges between 1.7 and 10 during the period 2002 to 2005, cf. Figure XXXX
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6. Conclusion
This paper uses rich linked worker-rm data from Denmark to address how o¤shoring a¤ects
rm level average wage. We use Chinas accession to the WTO in December 2001 and the boom
in Chinese exports soon after, as an exogenous shock to the incentive to o¤shore to China by
Danish rms. This shock allows us to identify the causal e¤ect of o¤shoring on wages.
Unlike other papers in this literature, we consider di¤erent possible channelsnamely skill
composition and rent sharing e¤ectsto explain o¤shoring induced gains in rm average wages.
A skill composition e¤ect increases average wage if rms send low-skilled jobs abroad retaining
high skilled workers at home who require higher pay. A rent sharing e¤ect increases average
wage if rms share o¤shoring induced increase in prots with all existing worker. Our ndings
show that rms sourcing from China in 2002 had higher increase in average wages between
2002 and 2005 compared to the control group.22 We nd that both skill composition and rent
sharing e¤ects signicantly matter in explaining the wage gain. Moreover, it is important to
separate out the e¤ects of the two channels since they have di¤erent policy implications. While
the presence of the skill composition e¤ects does underline that Danish rms o¤shore certain
jobs, the presence of the rent sharing e¤ect highlights that rms o¤shoring to China also enjoy
increased protability and share that with employees. The important result to highlight here is
that the timing of when a rm is exposed to a shock to the incentive to o¤shore matters. In our
case: Firms present in China before Chinas accession to the WTO in December 2001 o¤shored
jobs using relatively unskilled labor. Whereas, rms not present in China before the time of
accession increased protability and shared these increases with their employees, thus pointing to
increased welfare. These rms however did not o¤shore relatively more any particular skill type
of job. One possible explanation for this could be the size di¤erence of the two types of rms and
hence their workforce composition. Smaller manufacturing rms (less than thirty employees) are
likely to have more homogeneous workforce and for them the average skill level of the workers
might not change much over the years. Bigger rms already o¤shoring to China are likely to
have more diverse workforce and hence for them both composition and rent sharing matter for
the wage increase. However, the skill composition e¤ect signicantly explains about half that
gain while the other half explained by the rent sharing e¤ect is not statistically signicant.
Though we carry out estimations at the rm level, we fully utilize the worker-rm match
data. Following Frias, Kaplan & Verhoogen (2012) we decompose the e¤ects on average wages
22Firms o¤shoring to low middle income countries but not China and non-o¤shoring rms.
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into estimated e¤ects due to skill composition changes and changes due to rent sharing. We
compare these results with results obtained using measures of skill composition and rent sharing
available from typical rm level data. We show that using linked worker-rm data allows us
added insight behind the wage increase mechanism because, in our case, the two sets of results
do not conform; ratio of educated to uneducated workers as a traditional measure for skill
composition and sales per employee as a measure of rent sharing cannot explain the average
wage increase. Our measure of composition and rent sharing constructed from the worker level
wage regression of the AKM type do.
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Appendix
Table 1: Comparison of manufacturing rm characteristics
between o¤shoring and non-o¤shoring rms in 2005
All firms Offshoring firms
Non-offshoring
firms
Regr. Mean
difference
No. of firms 5281 3007 2274
Means
Log (employees) 3,41 3,78 2,93 0.85***
(1) (1,09) (0,56) (0,02)
Log (sales) 17,05 17,70 16,19 1.20***
(1,36) (1,31) (0,87) (0,03)
Skill ratio, edu/non-edu 3,65 3,76 3,50 0.26**
(3,88) (4,15) (3,47) (0,11)
Log (EBIT per worker) 10,83 11,08 10,51 0.36***
(1,1) (1,12) (0,99) (0,04)
Log (hourly wage) 5,20 5,25 5,14 0.06***
(0,19) (0,17) (0,21) (0,01)
Note: Educated (edu.) means have more than high school education and non-educated (no edu.) refers to less than or equal to
twelve years of education. The last column gives difference in the means between offshoring and non-offshoring firms; all
regressions include industry fixed effect and employment is included as additional control in all regressions except
log(employees).
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Figure 1: Chinese Exports in Billions of US Dollars
Source:
Figure 2: Danish manufacturing imports (in logs) from
selected partners and groups of partners
Note: Growth rates of imports from China are between two and ten times the growth rates of
imports from Eastern Europe between 2002 and 2005.
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
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Figure 3: Share of Danish Firms Sourcing from China
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Note: Values on left hand axis relate to share of all rms importing from China. Values related to
share of manufacturing rms importing from China are on the right hand axis.
Table 2: Comparison of rm characteristic by type in 2002
wage sales/emp sales emp
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.082*** 0.621*** 2.18*** 1.56***
(0.012) (0.041) (0.112) (0.096)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.049*** 0.55*** 1.88*** 1.33***
(0.016) (0.054) (0.128) (0.116)
Former Offshoring
Firms
0.084*** 0.682*** 2.12*** 1.44***
(0.03) (0.143) (0.251) (0.235)
N 3336 3337 3337 3337
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. The omitted group is firms not
offshoring to China but offshoring to other low-middle income countries and non-offshoring firms in 1999/2002.
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Table 3: Import growth contributions
Table3a: Import growth contributions (annualized) in per cent of base total (1999-2001)
All China Low/med income High income
Consumption 2.1 6.2 3.1 2.0
Intermediate 8.6 18.2 12.7 8.3
Total 10.7 24.4 15.8 10.3
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Low/med
income group excludes China.
Table 3b: Import growth contributions (annualized) in per cent of base total (2002-2005)
All China Low/med income High income
Consumption 0.1 10.5 -1.7 0.1
Intermediate 2.0 17.0 12.1 1.1
Total 2.1 27.5 10.3 1.2
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Low/med
income group excludes China.
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Table 4: Ranking Imported Consumption Products
Table 4a: HS6 Manufacturing imported consumption goods 2005 2002
Rank
in 2002
160540 Crustaceans nes, prepared or preserved 53340799 1311804 52
711719 Imitation jewellery nes of base metal including plate 43417328 9816229 6
940360 Furniture, wooden, nes 38544723 1117227 61
030420 Fish fillets, frozen 33941755 3303811 23
620333 Mens, boys jackets, blazers, synthetic fibre, not kni 33804627 179689 152
620343 Mens, boys trousers shorts, synthetic fibre, not knit 32858528 12386218 4
392690 Plastic articles nes 26146710 17187523 2
940179 Seats with metal frames, nes 24050163 908627 75
950390 Toys nes 23540912 5684666 15
940490 Articles of bedding nes 21799778 8238720 9
630790 Made up articles (textile) nes, textile dress pattern 21016679 8610865 8
490199 Printed reading books, except dictionaries etc 20984376 7848889 10
940140 Seats convertible into beds 20758743 10773086 5
902190 Orthopaedic appliances, nes 18376033 4452192 19
950330 Construction sets and constructional toys, nes 17444588 1008915 67
620332 Mens, boys jackets & blazers, of cotton, not knit 16619985 370365 122
940161 Seats with wooden frames, upholstered nes 16251353 600429 92
620462 Womens, girls trousers & shorts, of cotton, not knit 13046353 853358 77
851629 Electric space heating nes and soil heating apparatus 12438464
611030 Pullovers, cardigans etc of manmade fibres, knit 10878943 1957272 37
Table 4b: HS6 Manufacturing imported consumption goods 2001 1999
Rank
in 1999
850980 Domestic appliances, with electric motor, nes 25840768
392690 Plastic articles nes 18687247 6150690 12
610711 Mens, boys underpants or briefs, of cotton, knit 16505069 18054200 3
030420 Fish fillets, frozen 14937704 136284 146
620343 Mens, boys trousers shorts, synthetic fibre, not knit 14733910 2602090 23
902190 Orthopaedic appliances, nes 12922589 6737316 9
950330 Construction sets and constructional toys, nes 11641092 3671195 19
040900 Honey, natural 9237678 4331478 18
030619 Crustaceans nes, frozen, 9110324 6118847 13
420231 Articles for pocket or handbag, leather outer surface 8706212 4630337 16
841840 Freezers of the upright type, < 900 litre capacity 8292136 1909480 33
940490 Articles of bedding nes 8131019 11693002 5
420292 Containers nes, outer surface plastic or textile 7603965 921955 51
950390 Toys nes 7148450 2346638 26
821599 Cutlery not in sets, not plated with precious metal 6836842 5752128 14
630790 Made up articles (textile) nes, textile dress pattern 6714122 21671684 2
640291 Boots, soles/uppers rubber or plastic, over ankle, ne 6486472
611090 Pullovers, cardigans etc of material nes knit 6417276 611280 67
490199 Printed reading books, except dictionaries etc 5820386 6725830 10
660110 Garden and similar umbrellas 5793580 2503043 24
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Amounts are in DKK. . Classication of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow
the BACI classication from CEPII. Rank gives the position of the commodity in DKK in the year
2002 and 1999.
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Table 5: Ranking Imported Intermediate Products
Table 5a: HS6 Manufacturing imported intermediate goods 2005 2002
Rank in
2002
848180 Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, nes 126744085 31182357 9
870839 Brake system parts except linings for motor vehicles 107457536 34315 307
848190 Parts of taps, cocks, valves or similar appliances 99517689 71550756 2
853400 Electronic printed circuits 82899720 39798006 6
732510 Cast articles, of non-malleable cast iron nes 62931197 1049846 103
841391 Parts of pumps for liquids 49542779 44151963 5
730723 Pipe fittings, butt welding of stainless steel 47028226 10519817 23
350790 Enzymes nes, prepared enzymes nes, except rennet 45636175 20757774 15
940390 Furniture parts nes 40444629 5836004 32
852990 Parts for radio/tv transmit/receive equipment, nes 39835005 3784459 50
852190 Video record/reproduction apparatus not magnetic tape 36282907 2326 419
730890 Structures and parts of structures, iron or steel, ne 29505922 5427577 35
851890 Parts of non-recording electronic equipment 27387806 27234039 12
901920 Therapeutic respiration apparatus 27136114 3227836 54
848130 Valves, check 26261257 3844912 48
840999 Parts for diesel and semi-diesel engines 26028088 1760985 76
852090 Audio recording equipment without sound reproduction 25299813 4917146 39
850431 Transformers electric, power capacity < 1 KVA, nes 22112709 29551079 10
850440 Static converters, nes 20603780 54295373 4
853690 Electrical switch, protector, connecter for < 1kV nes 18316477 2005028 72
Table 5b: HS6 Manufacturing imported intermediate goods 2001 1999
Rank in
1999
851822 Multiple loudspeakers, mounted in single enclosure 114262840 32312257 6
760429 Bars, rods and other profiles, aluminium alloyed 67087534
841391 Parts of pumps for liquids 56487117 29320032 7
853400 Electronic printed circuits 40652653 3689736 33
851890 Parts of non-recording electronic equipment 35982391 6541136 22
848180 Taps, cocks, valves and similar appliances, nes 34947270 150615 136
848190 Parts of taps, cocks, valves or similar appliances 33820169 5482547 23
851829 Loudspeakers, nes 28085847 343302 103
850431 Transformers electric, power capacity < 1 KVA, nes 27948139 586888 91
730729 Pipe fittings of stainless steel except butt welding 26270529 46720486 3
392340 Plastic spools, cops, bobbins and similar supports 26226470 32682536 5
293627 Vitamin C, derivatives, unmixed 23789420 21150890 8
121230 Apricot, peach and plum stones & kernels, human food 17860915 8777163 16
680100 Stone setts, curbstones, flagstones (except slate) 17197610 3743352 32
854441 Electric conductors, nes < 80 volts, with connectors 16348712 888264 74
902140 Hearing aids, except parts and accessories 16298009 33694520 4
871491 Bicycle frames and forks, and parts thereof 14209632 7315550 19
852290 Parts and accessories of recorders except cartridges 13885985
900190 Prisms, mirrors and optical elements nes, unmounted 11352433 4741506 28
940520 Electric table, desk, bedside and floor lamps 10565394 566506 92
Source: External rm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Amounts are in DKK. . Classication of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow
the BACI classication from CEPII. Rank gives the position of the commodity in DKK in the year
2002 and 1999.
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Table 6: Decomposing imports
Table 6a: Decomposing imports from China (2002-2005)
Change Margin shares of trade increase
(M DKR) Extensive Intensive
Consumption 489 25% 75%
Intermediate 795 37% 63%
Total 1284 32% 68%
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Low/med
income group excludes China.
Table 6b: Decomposing imports from China (2002-2005) by rm types
Firms Offshoring to China in
2002
Firms offshoring to China in
2003- 2005
Change
Margin shares of
trade increase Change
Margin shares of trade
increase
(M DKR) Extensive Intensive
(M
DKR) Extensive Intensive
Consumption 350 30% 70% 139 100% 0
Intermediate 426 39% 61% 369 100% 0
Total 776 35% 65% 508 100% 0
Source: External firm level trade statistics, Statistics Denmark, own calculations
Notes: Classification of consumption goods and intermediate goods follow the BACI classification from CEPII. Last column
contains firms offshoring to China in 2003-2005 period but not 2002.
Table 7: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence Estimate (2002-2005)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Δl(avgwage) Δemp Δsk_ratio Δ(sales/emp) Δsales Δoffshore
Offshoring in 2002
0.015*** -0.062*** 0.036*** 0.011 -0.051** 0.010***
(0.005) (0.018) (0.011) (0.020) (0.023) (0.002)
N 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119 2119
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively. Dependent variable is differenced over 2002-2005 period.
Table 8: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimate by rm types (2002-2005)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Δ l(avgwage) Δ emp Δ sk_ratio Δ sales/emp Δ sales Δoffshore
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.015** -0.087*** 0.048** 0.003 -0.084** 0.02***
(0.006) (0.027) (0.020) (0.028) (0.036) (0.005)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.027*** -0.154*** 0.041* 0.005 -0.148*** 0.013***
(0.009) (0.038) (0.022) (0.040) (0.050) (0.004)
Former Offshoring
Firms
0.003 -0.133 0.006 -0.061 -0.195*** 0.004
(0.016) (0.092) (0.033) (0.106) (0.067) (0.002)
N 1915 1915 1761 1915 1915 1915
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regressions include industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate
significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 9: Triple Di¤erence Estimate by Firm Types
1 2 3 4 5 6
Δ l(avgwage) Δ emp Δ sk_ratio Δ sales/emp Δ sales Δoffshore
Existing
Offshoring Firms
0.007 -0.035 0.019 0.000 -0.035 0.018***
(0.009) (0.036) (0.017) (0.038) (0.046) (0.006)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.036*** -0.134*** 0.013 0.019 -0.116* 0.014***
(0.012) (0.045) (0.021) (0.059) (0.068) (0.005)
Former Offshoring
Firms
0.002 -0.084 -0.008 -0.172 -0.255*** 0.022**
(0.022) (0.106) (0.040) (0.133) (0.096) (0.01)
N 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293 1293
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 10: Worker Level Wage Regression
age age2 experience experience2 high_sk med_sk
log wage 0.041*** -.0003*** 0.010*** -0.0003*** 0.460*** 0.395***
(0.0004) (0.000) (.0003) (0.000) (.0106) (.007)
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis estimated with 50 bootstrap replications, clustering at level of individuals. The
regression includes time fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively. Number of
observations 1106744.
Table 11: Di¤erence-in-di¤erence Estimate Using Measures
Constructed from Worker Level Wage Regression (2002-2005)
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in 2002
0.012** 0.003* 0.009**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004)
N 1742 1742 1742
Note: Robust standard errors in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. **,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 12: Triple Di¤erence Estimate Using Measures Constructed
from Worker Level Wage Regression by Firm Types
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.012* 0.008* 0.005
(0.007) (0.004) (0.008)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.018* 0.001 0.017*
(0.01) (0.005) (0.01)
Former Offshoring
Firms
-0.027 -0.019 -0.008
(0.024) (0.02) (0.015)
N 1272 1272 1272
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 13: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimate Using Alternate Firm Types (2002-2005)
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in
2002
0.013** 0.005* 0.008*
(0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Offshoring after
2002
0.011* 0.002 0.009*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
N 1742 1742 1742
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 14: Triple Di¤erence Estimate Using Alternate Firm Types
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in
2002
0.016** 0.007** 0.009*
(0.007) (0.004) (0.006)
Offshoring after
2002
0.017* 0.009* 0.008
(0.010) (0.005) (0.009)
N 1483 1483 1483
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
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Table 15: Di¤erence-in-Di¤erence Estimate Using Manufacturing and
Non-Manufacturing Firms (2002-2005)
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Offshoring in
2002
0.018*** 0.005* 0.013***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
N 6253 6253 6253
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. All regression includes industry fixed effects. ***,**,* indicate significance
at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively.
Table 16: Triple Di¤erence Estimate Using Manufacturing and
Non-Manufacturing Firm
1 2 3
Δ avg(lwage) Δ sk_comp Δ rent_sh
Existing Offshoring
Firms
0.01* 0.012** -0.002
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
New Offshoring
Firms
0.02** 0.012* 0.009
(0.01) (0.007) (0.08)
Former Offshoring
Firms
-0.026* -0.013 -0.013
(0.013) (0.012) (0.013)
N 6808 6808 6808
Note: Robust standard error in the parenthesis. ***,**,* indicate significance at 1,5,10 percent levels respectively
Table 17: Firm share of imports coming from China (CN)
between 1999 and 2005
No. of
firms* 1999 2001 2002 2005
Firms not present in CN in 2002 402 16% 10% 15%
Firms not present in CN in 2002 but not in 1999 294 5% 6% 13%
Firms present in CN in 2002 1803 16% 17% 15% 22%
Firms present in CN before, in, and after 2002 805 16% 20% 20% 26%
Firms present before 2002 and again in 2005 45 11% 4% 8%
* Based on 2002
Source: Statistic Denmark’s firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
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Table 18: Danish rms importing from China (CN) and the Czech Republic (CZ)
Number of manufacturing firms Imports from China.. Imports from CZ..
..in total ..and not CZ ..in total ..and not CN
Importers in 2002 3995 3391 1637 287
Importers in 2005 7033 6539 872 98
Not importing from either two in 2002 3015 3015
New to import from source 3038 580 -765 14
Source: Statistic Denmark’s firm level external trade statistics, own calculations
Table 19: Using 2002-2004 as the shock period (triple di¤erence estimates
comparable with the main results of Table 12)
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